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second moments of the market return and the risk-free interest rate. The model also generates a very volatile
Sharpe ratio and market price of risk.
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Abstract
This paper studies the determinants of the equity premium as implied by producers’ first-
order conditions. A closed form expression is presented for the Sharpe ratio at steady-state
as a function of investment volatility and adjustment cost curvature. Calibrated to the U.S.
postwar economy, the model can generate a sizeable equity premium, with reasonable volatility
for market returns and risk free rates. The market’s Sharpe ratio and the market price of risk
are very volatile. Contrary to most models, the model generates a negative correlation between
conditional means and standard deviations of aggregate excess returns.
( Keywords: Equity Premium, Production. JEL: G12, E23.)
In the twenty years since Mehra and Prescott’s paper on the equity premium puzzle many
studies have proposed and evaluated utility functions for their ability to explain the most salient
aggregate asset pricing facts. Several specifications have demonstrated their ability to improve
considerably over a basic time-separable constant relative risk aversion setup. Despite the progress,
however, it seems that we have not yet reached the state where there would be a widely accepted
replacement for the standard time-separable utility specification.
Contrary to the consumption side, the production side of asset pricing has received considerably
less attention. Focusing on the production side shifts the burden towards representing production
technologies and interpreting production data. While a number of asset pricing studies have
considered nontrivial production sectors, these have generally been studied jointly with some
specific preference specification. Thus, the analysis could not escape the constraints imposed by
∗I am grateful for the comments received from seminar participants at the following locations: Wharton, UBC,
BI School, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, NYU, SED meeting Budapest, University
of Chicago, UCLA, Carnegie-Mellon, HEC Lausanne, USC, Columbia University, and the University of Texas at
Austin. In particular, I like to thank for comments from Andy Abel, Fernando Alvarez, Harjoat Bhamra, Joao
Gomes, Stavros Panageas and Thorsten Hens, and for research assistance from Jianfeng Yu. The most recent
version of this paper can be found at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~jermann/research.html
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the preference side. A pure production asset pricing literature has emerged from the Q-theory of
investment. However, typically, these studies consider a limited set of implications for the links
between investment and stock returns, but not the equity premium.1
In this paper I am interested in studying the macroeconomic determinants of asset prices given
by a multi-input aggregate production technology. The focus is exclusively on the producers’ first-
order conditions that link production variables and state prices, with sectorial investment playing
the key role. Two sets of questions are considered. First, what properties of investment and
production technologies are important for the first and second moments of risk free rates and
aggregate equity returns? Second, does a model plausibly calibrated to the U.S. economy have
the ability to replicate first and second moments of risk free rates and aggregate equity returns?
The work most closely related to mine are Cochrane’s contributions on production-based asset
pricing (1988, 1991). Some of the features that diﬀerentiate my work are that I focus explicitly on
the equity premium, use more general functional forms for adjustment cost, and base the empirical
evaluation on the two main sectorial aggregates of U.S. capital investment, namely equipment &
software as well as structures. Cochrane (1993) derives a set of asset pricing implications of a
production function where the productivity level can be selected in a state-contingent way.
My model pictures the problem of a representative producer that selects multiple fixed input
factors. In order to be able to recover the state-price process, the setup needs to have two related
properties. First, markets need to be complete and the producer has to face a full set of state-
prices. Second, there needs to be as many predetermined factors of production as there are states
of nature. This assumption of “complete technologies” is necessary in order to be able to recover
the full set of state-contingent prices from the production side. In most studies with nontrivial
production sectors this property is not satisfied; of course, in a general equilibrium environment
it doesn’t usually play such an important role.
The model is calibrated to a two sector representation. I use U.S. data on investment for
equipment & software, as well as for structures. These two types of investments sum to the total
of U.S. fixed business investment. With this representation the two sectors also have some natural
asymmetries. As becomes clear below, asymmetries across sectors play an important role in the
analysis.
1An incomplete list of contributions include: for successful utility functions, Abel (1990), Campbell and Cochrane
(1999), Constantinides (1990); for models with nontrivial production sectors Jermann (1998) and Rouwenhorst
(1995); for production asset pricing studies, Cochrane (1988, 1991), Li, Vassalou and Xing (2003), and Gomes,
Yaron and Zhang (2002). Other examples of related asset pricing studies with rich production structures are Berk,
Green and Naik (1999), Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2003), Hugonnier, Morellec and Sundaresan (2005), and
Tuzel (2004).
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One of the paper’s main contributions is to characterize the determinants of the equity pre-
mium. Specifically, a closed form expression is presented for the Sharpe ratio at steady-state as a
function of investment volatility and adjustment cost curvature. The key quantitative findings are
the following. For unconditional moments, the model can plausibly generate an equity premium
of several percentage points with risk free rates having a reasonable mean and volatility. For con-
ditional moments, the expected excess equity return is quite volatile–more volatile than the risk
free rate. Also, concerning aggregate excess returns, the correlation between conditional means
and volatilities is negative.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the model and section 2 some general asset
pricing implications. Section 3 introduces functional forms. Section 4 characterizes theoretical
links between asset prices and investment. Section 5 contains the calibration and section 6 the
quantitative analysis.
1 Model
The model represents the producer’s choice of capital inputs for a given state price process. Key
ingredients are capital adjustment cost and stochastic productivity.
Assume an environment where uncertainty is modelled as the realization of s, one out of a
finite set S = (s1, s2, ...sN), with st the current period realization and st ≡ (s0, s1, ...st) the history
up to and including t. Probabilities of st are denoted by π
¡
st
¢
. Assume an aggregate production
function
Y
¡
st
¢
= F
³©
Kj
¡
st−1
¢ª
j∈J , s
t, N
¡
st
¢´
,
where st allows for a technology shock, Kj is the j-th capital stock, and N labor. Note that in the
analysis of the model, labor will not play an active role. Capital accumulation for capital good of
type j is represented by
Kj
¡
st
¢
= Kj
¡
st−1
¢
(1− δj) + Zj
¡
st
¢
Ij
¡
st
¢
,
where δj is the depreciation rate and Zj
¡
st
¢
the technology for producing capital goods. Assume
Zj
¡
st
¢
= Zj
¡
st−1
¢ · λZj (st), with λZj (st) following a N-state Markov process. The total cost of
investing in capital good of type j is given by
Hj
¡
Kj
¡
st−1
¢
, Ij
¡
st
¢
, Zj
¡
st
¢¢
.
This specification will be further specialized below.
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Taking as given state prices P
¡
st
¢
, the representative firm solves the following problem
max
{I,K0,N}
∞X
t=0
X
st
P
¡
st
¢⎡⎣ F ³©Kj ¡st−1¢ªj∈J , st, N ¡st¢´− w ¡st¢N ¡st¢
−
P
j Hj
¡
Kj
¡
st−1
¢
, Ij
¡
st
¢
, Zj
¡
st
¢¢
⎤
⎦
s.t.
£
P
¡
st
¢
qj
¡
st
¢¤
: Kj
¡
st−1
¢
(1− δj) + Zj
¡
st
¢
Ij
¡
st
¢
−Kj
¡
st
¢
≥ 0, ∀st, j
with s0 and Kj (s−1) given, and P (s0) = 1 without loss of generality.
The scaling of the multipliers is chosen so as to generate intuitive labels. Indeed, q represents
the marginal value of one unit of installed capital in terms of the numeraire of the same period. In
equilibrium, it is also the cost of installing one unit of capital including adjustment cost. Given the
homogeneity assumptions made below qZ is the ratio of the market value over the book value of
capital, that is, Tobin’s Q. Indeed, 1/Z is equal to the price of a unit of capital in terms of the final
good. The book value (or replacement cost) of the capital stock is then K/Z. The introduction of
the investment specific technology Z allows the model to capture the historical downward trend
observed in U.S. equipment prices.
First-order conditions are summarized by
0 = −Hj,2
¡
Kj
¡
st−1
¢
, Ij
¡
st
¢
, Zj
¡
st
¢¢
+ Zj
¡
st
¢
qj
¡
st
¢
,
qj
¡
st
¢
=
X
st+1
P
¡
st, st+1
¢
P (st)
⎡
⎣ FKj
³©
Ki
¡
st
¢ª
i∈J , s
t, st+1,N
¡
st, st+1
¢´
−Hj,1
¡
Kj
¡
st
¢
, Ij
¡
st, st+1
¢
, Zj
¡
st, st+1
¢¢
+ (1− δj) qj
¡
st, st+1
¢
⎤
⎦ ,
and
FN
¡©
Kj
¡
st−1
¢ª
, st, N
¡
st
¢¢
− w
¡
st
¢
= 0.
Substituting out shadow prices, we have
X
st+1
P
¡
st+1|st
¢
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
FKj
¡©
Kj
¡
st
¢ª
, st, st+1, N
¡
st, st+1
¢¢
−Hj,1
¡
Kj
¡
st
¢
, Ij
¡
st, st+1
¢
, Zj
¡
st, st+1
¢¢
+(1− δj)
Hj,2(Kj(st),Ij(st,st+1),Zj(st,st+1))
Zj(st,st+1)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
Ã
Zj
¡
st
¢
Hj,2 (Kj (st−1) , Ij (st) , Zj (st))
!
= 1
for each j, where the notation P
¡
st+1|st
¢
shows the price of the numeraire in st+1 conditional on st
and in units of the numeraire at st. From this condition, define the investment return RIj
¡
st, st+1
¢
implicitly through
P
st+1
P
¡
st+1|st
¢
RIj
¡
st, st+1
¢
= 1. RIj
¡
st, st+1
¢
is the return realized in st+1
from adding one (marginal) unit of capital of type j in state st. The first-order condition shows
that in equilibrium adding one marginal unit of a given type of capital produces a change in the
profit plan that is worth one unit.2
2Based on the details given below, strict concavity will be assumed, so that first-order and transversality condi-
tions (given below) are suﬃcient for a maximum.
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2 From investment returns to state prices and asset returns
In order to recover state prices uniquely from the producers first-order conditions it is necessary
to have as many types of capital inputs as there are states of nature. This "complete technolo-
gies" requirement represents the producers ability to move resources across all states of nature.
Representing the first-order conditions in matrix form yields for the case with two states of nature
and two capital inputs
⎡
⎣ R
I
1
¡
st, s1
¢
RI1
¡
st, s2
¢
RI2
¡
st, s1
¢
RI2
¡
st, s2
¢
⎤
⎦
⎡
⎣ P
¡
s1|st
¢
P
¡
s2|st
¢
⎤
⎦ = 1, (1)
or more compactly RI
¡
st
¢ · p ¡st¢ = 1. The state price vector is obtained by the matrix inversion
p
¡
st
¢
=
¡
RI
¡
st
¢¢−1
1.
Clearly, it isn’t necessarily the case that this matrix inversion is feasible nor that state prices are
necessarily positive for any chosen set of returns. As further discussed below, the requirement for
positive state prices will constrain the empirical implementation.
In this environment, the risk free return is given by
1/Rf
¡
st
¢
= 1p
¡
st
¢
= P
¡
s1|st
¢
+ P
¡
s2|st
¢
.
Starting with equation 1, it is easy to check that if one of the investment returns is not state-
contingent, that is RIj
¡
st, st+1
¢
= RIj
¡
st
¢
, then, as is implied by no-arbitrage, it equals the risk
free rate, RIj
¡
st
¢
= Rf
¡
st
¢
.
Consider aggregate capital returns
R
¡
st, st+1
¢
≡
D
¡
st, st+1
¢
+ V
¡
st, st+1
¢
V (st)
,
whereD
¡
st, st+1
¢
= F
¡©
Kj
¡
st−1
¢ª
, st, N
¡
st
¢¢
−w
¡
st
¢
N
¡
st
¢
−
P
j Hj
¡
Kj
¡
st−1
¢
, Ij
¡
st
¢
, Zj
¡
st
¢¢
represents the dividends paid by the firm and V
¡
st, st+1
¢
the ex-dividend value of the firm. As-
suming constant returns to scale in F (.) andHj (.), Hayashi’s (1982) result applies, and this return
will be equal to a weighted average of the investment returns:
R
¡
st, st+1
¢
=
X
j
qj
¡
st
¢
Kj
¡
st
¢P
i qi (s
t)Ki (st)
·RIj
¡
st, st+1
¢
. (2)
The market price of risk, aka the highest Sharpe ratio, also has a simple expression. Let us,
introduce the stochastic discount factor m
¡
st+1|st
¢
by dividing and multiplying through by the
probabilities π
¡
st+1|st
¢
, so that
P
¡
st+1|st
¢
=
Ã
P
¡
st+1|st
¢
π (st+1|st)
!
π
¡
st+1|st
¢
= m
¡
st+1|st
¢
π
¡
st+1|st
¢
.
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Ruling out arbitrage implies Et
¡
m
¡
st+1|st
¢
Re
¡
st, st+1
¢¢
= 0, for ∀Re
¡
st, st+1
¢
defined as an
excess return. It can then be shown that
max
E
£
Re
¡
st, st+1
¢ |st¤
Std [Re (st, st+1) |st] =
vuuutPst+1 P (st+1|st)2 /π (st+1|st)hP
st+1
P (st+1|st)
i2 − 1.
3 Functional Forms
This section presents the functional forms and the simulation strategies.
3.1 Investment cost function
The investment cost function plays a crucial role in the analysis. Its form is chosen to satisfy two
criteria. First, I require investment returns to be stationary. This is achieved through a particular
type of homogeneity. Second, I want the curvature of the cost function to be slightly more general
than the standard quadratic specification.
A simple functional form that satisfies these criteria is
H (K, I, Z) =
½
b
ν
(ZI/K)ν + c
¾
(K/Z) ,
with b, c > 0, ν > 1. For each capital stock, diﬀerent parameter values will be allowed. For
compactness, the notation doesn’t express that. As can easily be seen, this function is convex in
I for ν > 1. Adjustment cost and the direct cost for additional capital goods are separable, triv-
ially so because H (K, I, Z) = [H (1, ZI/K)− ZI/K + ZI/K] · (K/Z) = [H (1, ZI/K)− ZI/K] ·
(K/Z) + I ≡ C (1, ZI/K) · (K/Z) + I. I impose restrictions on the parameters of H (.) so that
C (1, ZI/K) ≥ 0, that is, the pure adjustment cost is nonnegative.
The cost function is homogenous of degree 1 in I and K/Z. This is required for balanced
growth. Indeed, given the capital accumulation equation, IZ and K are cointegrated, and so are I
and K/Z. With this homogeneity assumption, the investment cost H(.) will share the same trend
as I and K/Z. As further discussed below, some balanced growth requirement will contribute to
making investment returns stationary.
For a given investment process, the curvature parameter ν determines the volatility of the
market price of capital. This parameter will be a crucial contributor to return volatility and risk
premiums. From the first-order conditions the following relationship between the investment rate
and the marginal cost of capital is obtained
qZ = b (IZ/K)ν−1 .
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The elasticity of qZ with respect to IZ/K is
∂qZ
∂ (IZ/K)
IZ/K
qZ
= ν − 1.
In addition to having the degree of freedom to chose this curvature parameter, the ability to have
diﬀerent curvatures across sectors will be important.
The parameters b and c are less important for asset pricing implications. They provide the
flexibility to center the adjustment cost function and to minimize the amount of resources lost
due to adjustment cost. It is easy to see that by setting ν = b = 1, and c = 0, the case without
adjustment cost is obtained
H (K, I,Z) = I.
3.2 Production function
I chose a production function that is consistent with stationary investment returns and that is
easily tractable. Specifically, output, after payments to labor, is a linearly separable function of
the capital stocks
F
³©
Kj
¡
st
¢ª
j∈J , s
t, st+1, N
¡
st+1
¢´
− w
¡
st+1
¢
N
¡
st+1
¢
=
X
j
Aj (st+1)
Zj (st)
Kj
¡
st
¢
.
Marginal products of capital are then
FKj
³©
Kj
¡
st
¢ª
j∈J , s
t, st+1, N
¡
st, st+1
¢´
=
Aj (st+1)
Zj (st)
.
The term Zj is introduced to guarantee stationary returns. It implies, for instance, that as a
given capital gets cheaper to produce, that is as Z increases, it also becomes less productive. This
is related to one of the properties implied by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell’s (1997) balanced
growth path. Aj (st+1) can be thought of as a productivity shock.
3.3 Simulation strategy and stationarity of returns
The spirit of the quantitative analysis is to assume that the optimal investment process is known.
The implied investment returns and state prices can then easily be derived. As mentioned above,
I want returns to be stationary. This also imposes additional restrictions on technologies and the
assumed optimal investment process. These issues are discussed here in detail.
Assume that sectorial investment growth rates follow finite element Markov chains, that is,
Ij
¡
st, st+1
¢
= Ij
¡
st
¢
λIj (st+1). Under the assumed functional forms, investment returns can then
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be written as
RIj
¡
st, st+1
¢
=
Aj,t+1
b (ZjtIj,t/Kj,t)
ν−1 (3)
+
³
1/λ
Zj
t+1
´
· b
¡
1− 1ν
¢
(Zj+1tIjt+1/Kjt+1)
ν − c
b (ZjtIj,t/Kj,t)
ν−1
+
³
1/λZjt+1
´
· (1− δj) · b (Zjt+1Ij,t+1/Kj,t+1)
ν−1
b (ZjtIj,t/Kj,t)
ν−1 ,
with,
Zjt+1Ij,t+1/Kj,t+1 = (ZjtIjt/Kj,t+1)λ
Ij
t+1λ
Zj
t+1,
where for compactness the state-dependence is not explicit.
Inspection of equation (3) reveals that given the various assumptions made on the exogenous
processes and functional forms, investment returns are stationary. However, stationarity of sec-
torial investment returns is not suﬃcient for the stationarity of aggregate asset returns. Indeed,
as shown in equation (2), the aggregate return equals a weighted average of the sectorial returns.
For stationarity, the weights need to be stationary too. Aggregate returns are given by
R
¡
st, st+1
¢
=
X
j
b(ZjtIj,t/Kj,t)
ν−1
Zj,t
Kj,t+1P
i
b(ZitIi,t/Ki,t)
ν−1
Zi,t
Ki,t+1
RIj
¡
st, st+1
¢
.
A suﬃcient (and necessary) condition for stationarity, given the previous assumptions, is that
K1,t+1/Z1,t and K2,t+1/Z2,t are cointegrated. Given that the investment capital ratios ZjtIj,t/Kj,t
are stationary, this is equivalent to I1,t and I2,t being cointegrated. Setting investment expendi-
ture growth rates equal across sectors, that is λI1 (st+1) = λI2 (st+1), guarantees that I1,t and I2,t
are cointegrated. Thus, because individual quantities have stochastic trends, I end up choosing
identical investment expenditure growth realizations across sectors to guarantee stationarity of
aggregate equity returns. However, I am free to choose the realizations for λZ1t and λ
Z2
t inde-
pendently. This is less restrictive than it might appear for several reasons. As seen above, what
matters for the investment returns is the behavior of the product λI1t λ
Z1
t , and not λ
I1
t individually.
That is to say that the important element in the calibration is to fit the process of real investment
growth rather than the growth in investment expenditure. Moreover, for the considered empirical
counterparts, as shown below, the historical volatilities of λI1and λI2 are nearly identical, and
realizations of the two growth rates are strongly positively correlated. Alternatively, one could
introduce additional components for each process that have purely transitory eﬀects and would
thus not need to be restricted to ensure balanced growth. However, given the requirement to
keep the number of states small, the additional flexibility introduced in this way would be rather
limited.
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To summarize the dynamic structure, realized investment returns are given as functions of the
following
RIj
¡
st, st+1
¢
= RIj
¡
Zj
¡
st
¢
Ij
¡
st
¢
/Kj
¡
st−1
¢
;λI (st+1) ,λZj (st+1) , Aj (st+1)
¢
for j = 1, 2.
For the simulations, I can generate realizations of all quantities of interest based on a probability
matrix describing the law of motion for the exogenous state st+1. The law of motion for the rest
of the variables follows as
Ij
¡
st, st+1
¢
= Ij
¡
st
¢
λI (st+1) for j = 1, 2,
Zj
¡
st, st+1
¢
= Zj
¡
st
¢
λZj (st+1) for j = 1, 2, and
Kj
¡
st
¢
= Kj
¡
st−1
¢
(1− δj) + Zj
¡
st
¢
Ij
¡
st
¢
for j = 1, 2.
Seven variables are a suﬃcient statistic for the current state of the economy st, namely st,
K1
¡
st−1
¢
, K2
¡
st−1
¢
, I1
¡
st
¢
, I2
¡
st
¢
, Z1
¡
st
¢
, Z2
¡
st
¢
. Clearly Kj
¡
st
¢
matters too, but it is
a function of the state variables. The probability distribution of the shocks is summarized by
st, the realization of the return does not depend on st. As initial conditions, I set K2
¡
s−1
¢
=
Z1
¡
s0
¢
= Z2
¡
s0
¢
= 1, and K1
¡
s−1
¢
is set equal to the historical average of the ratio of the value
of capital in this sector relative to the other sector. Initial investment levels are assumed at their
implied steady state values.
4 Theoretical analysis
This section contains a series of theoretical results that explain key model mechanisms. The first
issue concerns the determinants of the equity premium. I present a simple expression for the Sharpe
ratio that depends only on the investment cost curvature and the investment volatility. Second,
the issue of what constitutes an admissible investment process for a given technology specification
is examined. One finding is that sectorial diﬀerences in the adjustment cost parameters νj are
crucial for generating admissible state prices from investment. Two additional results are included.
First, an upper bound for the Sharpe ratio is derived. This will illustrate some of the quantitative
findings. Finally, it is shown that in a model without technology shocks interest rates cannot be
constant if one is interested in recovering state prices from producers first-order conditions.
4.1 What determines the equity premium?
I consider here the relationship between investment and asset prices, and in particular the equity
premium. For this analysis, a continuous-time representation is more convenient than the discrete-
time model used sofar. The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, I show that in order to have
9
a positive equity premium, the investment return that is expected to be higher needs to be the
more volatile. Second, I show that under some conditions, asymmetries in the investment cost
curvature ν can generate this property, and a simple expression for the Sharpe ratio is presented.
As a counterpart to the two-state representation in discrete time, consider a one-dimensional
Brownian motion. Investment returns are given by
dRj
Rj
= µj (.) dt+ σj (.) dz, for j = 1, 2, (4)
and the state-price process also has this form
dΛ
Λ
= −rf (.) dt+ σ (.) dz. (5)
Assume that the two returns are positively (perfectly) correlated so that sign (σ1) = sign (σ2).
The drift and diﬀusion coeﬃcients are allowed to change with the state of the economy. For
compactness, from now on, the notation will not explicitly acknowledge this.
The objective is to derive the drift and diﬀusion terms of the state-price process, −rf and σ,
from the given return processes, that is from the four values µj and σj for j = 1, 2. Remember,
in this environment, the absence of arbitrage implies that
0 = Et
µ
dΛt
Λt
¶
+Et
µ
dRjt
Rjt
¶
+Et
µ
dΛt
Λt
dRjt
Rjt
¶
, (6)
so that
0 = −rfdt+ µidt+ σiσdt,
and thus there are 2 equations and 2 unknowns. The solution of this system is
rf =
σ2µ1 − σ1µ2
σ2 − σ1
−σ = µ2 − µ1
σ2 − σ1
.
Clearly, in order to be able to recover the state-price process from the two returns, the two
volatility terms have to be diﬀerent across sectors, that is σ2 − σ1 6= 0. This is an invertibility
requirement similar to the one for the discrete time case. However, there is no issue here about
possibly negative state prices. Indeed, a process such as (5) cannot become negative if it is initially
positive.
From the pricing equation (6), the volatility term equals the Sharpe ratio
−σ = µ1 − r
f
σ1
=
µ2 − rf
σ2
,
and using the solutions derived above
µ1 − rf = −σσ1 = σ1
∙
µ2 − µ1
σ2 − σ1
¸
. (7)
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Clearly, with positively correlated returns, that is sign (σ1) = sign (σ2), the signs of both sectorial
risk premiums are identical, and thus the sign of the aggregate equity premium, a weighted average
of the sectorial premiums, will be the same as for the two sectorial premiums. From equation (7)
it is easy to see that there is a positive equity premium in the aggregate if, and only if, the return
with the higher risk premium is more volatile.3
Let us now make the link to the production side of the model. I consider a model without
technology shocks, where the only source of uncertainty are the state prices. Technology shocks
could be added for this analysis, but given their relatively minor quantitative impact, as shown
later in the paper, keeping the expressions simple seems preferable. As shown in the appendix,
the realized return to a given capital stock equals
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
A− c
b
³
It
Kt
´ν−1 +µ1− 1ν
¶
It/Kt − δ + (ν − 1)
∙¡
λI − 1
¢
− (It/Kt − δ) +
1
2
(ν − 2)σ2I
¸⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭
dt+(ν − 1)σIdz,
(8)
where
¡
λI − 1
¢
and σI are drift and diﬀusion terms of investment. Consider this return when¡
λI − 1
¢
− (It/Kt − δ) = 0. This holds at the deterministic steady state for given
¡
λI − 1
¢
and δ,
assuming
¡
λI − 1
¢
+ δ > 0. The return then simplifies to½¡
R¯− 1
¢
+
1
2
(ν − 1) (ν − 2)σ2I
¾
dt+ (ν − 1)σIdz. (9)
Where R¯ is the return in a deterministic model at the steady state with the same technology
parameters and where investment growth equals λI .4 As discussed further below, it is convenient
to calibrate the model by picking a value for R¯, the steady-state return, independently from other
parameters, which implicitly sets A at a given level. Focusing on the return at this steady state
point should be informative about average model behavior. There is an example at the end of the
quantitative analysis that confirms this.
Consider now how ν and δ contribute to the sign and magnitude of the equity premium, given
that these are the main asymmetries between equipment and structures that are considered in
the quantitative analysis. As is clear from equation (9), for a given R¯, there is no separate role
for depreciation rates at steady state. Let’s normalize ν2 > ν1. Because (ν − 1) multiplies σIdz,
given the normalization, the volatility term of sector 2 is larger, that is σ2 > σ1, having assumed
equal investment volatility σI across sectors.5 Whether this asymmetry can generate a positive
3 Indeed, if σ1,σ2 > 0, this implies that if µ2−µ1 > 0, one needs σ2−σ1 > 0, and it can be seen that µ1−rf > 0.
Alternatively, if σ1,σ2 < 0, this condition implies that if µ2 − µ1 > 0 one needs σ2 − σ1 < 0, (sector 2 is more
volatile), and then again µ1 − rf > 0.
4 R¯ = A−c
b(λI−(1−δ))v−1
+
?
1− 1
v
?
λI + 1
v
(1− δ) .
5As will be shown in the quantitative analysis, historical investment growth volatilities in the two sectors are
roughly identical.
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equity premium depends then on the eﬀect of ν on the drift. It is easy to see that
∂ (ν − 1) (ν − 2)
∂ν
= 2
µ
ν − 3
2
¶
→ if ν > 3
2
then
∂ (ν − 1) (ν − 2)
∂ν
> 0.
That is, starting from a common curvature parameter ν > 32 , and increasing the curvature in one
sector, the sector with the higher curvature will have a higher drift, everything else equal. Thus, if
ν > 1.5, and if there are no sectorial asymmetries except the diﬀerence in ν, σ2 > σ1and µ2 > µ1,
that is, as shown in equation 7 above, the equity premium is positive.
Some algebra shows that the Sharpe ratio at steady state, again assuming σIj = σI , is given
as
µj − rf
σj
|ss = R¯2 − R¯1
(v2 − v1)σI
+
ν1 + ν2 − 3
2
σI . (10)
The first term shows how a diﬀerence in the deterministic returns R¯j contributes to an increase
in the Sharpe ratio if the higher deterministic return corresponds to the more volatile return.
Unfortunately, there seems to be little direct empirical evidence about the levels of R¯j , in particular
about the exact level of the marginal product terms Aj . For this reason I will later focus the
quantitative analysis on the case R¯j = R.6
For the case R¯j = R, because, σj and σI have the same sign (given νj > 1), a necessary
and suﬃcient condition for a positive equity premium is that ν1 + ν2 > 3. Clearly, the equity
premium is then increasing in the sum of the curvature parameters. The equation suggests that the
curvature parameters ν have a similar role as the risk aversion coeﬃcient in the basic consumption-
based model. The equation for the Sharpe ratio, together with the return equations (8) and (9),
highlight a fundamental trade-oﬀ in the model’s ability to explain asset returns. Increasing the
curvature parameters ν increases the equity premium. However, this also makes returns more
volatile. Therefore, asset prices alone will impose a clear limit on how much curvature can be
used to generate large risk premiums. In standard consumption-based asset pricing models this
trade-oﬀ is much less present. In fact, in a basic constant relative risk aversion environment, for
the benchmark case with IID consumption growth, increasing risk aversion increases the equity
premium without aﬀecting return volatility.
Under the assumptions made here, the instantaneous interest rate at steady state, assuming
R¯j = R¯ and σIj = σI , is given as
rf |ss =
¡
R¯− 1
¢
− (v1 − 1) (v2 − 1)
σ2I
2
.
This expression shows how investment uncertainty contributes to a lower steady state interest rate
6Clearly, in a deterministic model, R¯j = R¯ would be required to rule out arbitrage. However, in a model with
uncertainty, sectorial diﬀerences in R¯j are possible.
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by an extent that is determined by the amount of the adjustment cost curvature. This parallels
the precautionary saving eﬀect on interest rates in standard consumption based models.
Sofar, R¯2 and R¯1 have been set independently from other parameters as a way of implicitly
selecting values for Aj . As mentioned above, this will also be the approach chosen in the quanti-
tative analysis. Alternatively, one could take all coeﬃcients determining R¯ as given, and consider
the partial derivatives with respect to ν and δ. In this case, the depreciation rate also matters
because it aﬀects R¯. For the calibration with two sectors representing equipment and structures,
respectively, structures are harder to adjust and depreciate more slowly than equipment. That
is, νS > νE, and δS < δE . Let us therefore consider the case where the capital with the higher
adjustment cost curvature depreciates more slowly. With a few steps of algebra, under the stan-
dard assumptions that ν > 1, λ − 1 − δ > 0, and (A− c) /b (λ− (1− δ))ν−1 > 0, one finds that
∂R¯
∂ν > 0, and
∂R¯
∂δ < 0. Thus, given the two dimensions of sectorial asymmetries assumed here, both
would contribute to µ2 > µ1, and because σ2 > σ1, both would contribute positively to the equity
premium.
4.2 What is an admissible investment process?
In this section I consider the requirements for an investment process to be admissible, in the sense
that it has to represent a solution to the firm’s problem for the implied state-price process, and
that this price process is itself well behaved. The two key requirements are that the derived state
prices have to be positive and that the implied firm value has to be finite. While a large set of
investment processes are admissible, these requirements nevertheless impose constraints on the
simulations. For this reason, this section also provides the motivations for some of the choices
made in the empirical analysis.
4.2.1 Positive state prices
The first key requirement is that state prices have to be positive. It is easy to see from equation
(1) that the relative state prices in the two-state case are given by
P
¡
st, s1
¢
P (st, s2)
=
RI2
¡
st, s2
¢
−RI1
¡
st, s2
¢
RI1 (s
t, s1)−RI2 (st, s1)
. (11)
For nonnegative investment returns, that is R > 0, state prices are positive if and only if the
numerator and the denominator have the same sign. This requirement implies that each capital
stock has to have a higher return than the other capital stock in one of the two states. Indeed,
if one type of investment were to generate a higher return in both states, then resources would
be moved into this type of capital from the other, meaning that this would not be an equilibrium
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outcome.7
To see what properties are needed to satisfy this requirement, consider now a second-order
Taylor-series approximation of the investment return around the deterministic steady state. To
focus on the quantitatively important channels, I again consider a model without technology
shocks where the only source of uncertainty are the state prices. Without technology shocks, the
investment return from equation (3) simplifies to
RIt,t+1
¡
st, sj
¢
=
A− c
b
³
It(st)
Kt(st−1)
´ν−1+
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(1− δ) +
µ
1− 1
ν
¶⎡
⎢⎣
It(st)
Kt(st−1)
It(st)
Kt(st−1)
+ (1− δ)
⎤
⎥⎦λ (st+1)
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
⎛
⎝ 1
It(st)
Kt(st−1)
+ (1− δ)
λ (st+1)
⎞
⎠
ν−1
.
(12)
Return realizations are now driven by the investment growth rate λ (st+1), while the only relevant
state variable is the current investment-capital ratio It
¡
st
¢
/Kt
¡
st−1
¢
. A second-order Taylor
approximation is obtained by assuming that the investment-capital ratio is at its steady state
It
¡
st
¢
/Kt
¡
st−1
¢
= λ¯− 1 + δ, for a given steady state growth rate λ¯, so that
RIt,t+1 = R¯+ (ν − 1)∆λ0 +
B
2
¡
∆λ0
¢2
+ o
³¡
∆λ0
¢2´ (13)
where ∆λ0 = λ0 − λ¯ and
B =
ν − 1
λ
½
ν − 1− 1− δ
λ
¾
.8
Assume equally sized up and down movements in a two-state setting so that
∆λj (s2) = −∆λj (s1) ≡ ∆λj , for each j ∈ (1, 2) .
Assume also, like in subsection 4.1, that the investment growth volatilities are equal in the two
sectors and positively correlated, so that
∆λ1 = ∆λ2 = ∆λ.
With this approximation, the ratio determining relative state prices is given as
P (., s1)
P (., s2)
=
[ν2 − ν1]∆λ+
h¡
R¯2 − R¯1
¢
+ 12 (B2 −B1)
¡
∆λ
¢2i
+ o
³¡
∆λ
¢2´
[ν2 − ν1]∆λ−
h¡
R¯2 − R¯1
¢
+ 12 (B2 −B1)
¡
∆λ
¢2i
+ o
³¡
∆λ
¢2´ (14)
7A related requirement for the ability to recover state prices is that the matrix of the investment returns R has
to be invertible.
8The only diﬀerence compared to the continuous-time equation derived above is the second-order term. With
(1− δ) = λ = 1, we would have B = (v − 1) (v − 2), which is the term in the continuous time counterpart.
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As shown by equation (14), in order to have positive prices at steady state, the first term in
the fraction needs to be far away from zero, that is
¯¯
[ν2 − ν1]∆λ
¯¯
>> 0. Thus, clearly, asymmetry
in the curvature parameters νj is needed to generate positive state prices.
State prices are also required to be positive away from steady state. Indeed, one of the issues
faced in the numerical experiments is that the investment capital ratio can reach very low levels. In
this case, the coeﬃcients of a second-order approximation around the current investment-capital
ratio can diﬀer substantially from their steady state values. Specifically, as can be seen from
equation (12), investment returns can get arbitrarily large as It
¡
st
¢
/Kt
¡
st−1
¢
gets close to 0.
Indeed, the first term (A− c) /b
µ
It(st)
Kt(st−1)
¶ν−1
can get arbitrarily large. Under these conditions,
the requirement for positive state prices can become hard to satisfy for all possible paths. What
makes this condition hard to satisfy is that it has to hold with probability one. In order to deal
with this in the simulations, the marginal product term, A, is made state contingent and its value
in the low growth state is set specifically so that state prices are positive for the lowest possible
It
¡
st
¢
/Kt
¡
st−1
¢
. As shown below, shocks to A have only second-order eﬀects on asset price
implications in general. This is because the level of A is so small relative to the other terms in the
return equation (12).
4.2.1.1 An upper bound for the Sharpe ratio The requirement for nonnegative state
prices has an implication for two-state environments in general. Namely, there is an upper bound
to the Sharpe ratio. In particular, if the two states are equally likely, the Sharpe ratio is bounded
by 1. Because the simulations will never deviate much from this case, this constraint typically
matters.
In a two-state environment, no arbitrage requires that for the excess return on the market
RM (s)−Rf ,
P (s1)
³
RM (s1)−Rf
´
+ P (s2)
³
RM (s2)−Rf
´
= 0.
This implies that, in line with equation (11), the ratio of the state prices is given by
P (s1)
P (s2)
=
¡
RM (s2)−Rf
¢
− (RM (s1)−Rf )
=
£
RM (s2)−ERM
¤
+
£
ERM −Rf
¤
− [RM (s1)−ERM ]− [ERM −Rf ]
.
It is easy to see that if both states are equally likely then
£
RM (s2)−ERM
¤
= −
£
RM (s1)−ERM
¤
= Std
¡
RM
¢
, so that
P (s1)
P (s2)
=
Std
¡
RM
¢
+
£
ERM −Rf
¤
Std (RM)− [ERM −Rf ] .
9
Because of the requirement of positive state prices, the denominator has to be positive, and
9The implicit normalization that RM (s2) > RM (s1) is without loss of generality.
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therefore the Sharpe ratio, ER
M−Rf
Std(RM )
, is bounded,
Std
¡
RM
¢
> ERM −Rf
1 >
ERM −Rf
Std (RM)
.
Clearly, this result applies to all models without arbitrage in a two-state environment. For instance,
it applies to the classic model used by Mehra and Prescott (1985). Based on the data of sectorial
investment growth I consider in this study, a reasonable calibration cannot deviate much from the
case where up and down movements are equally likely. Thus, the result derived here is relevant.
Because the requirement of positive state prices has to hold with probability one, the constraints on
the technology and the investment process end up reducing average Sharpe ratios in the simulations
to a level substantially below 1.10
4.2.2 Other requirements
Another requirement for simulations is that the value of the firm implied by an investment process
and a state price process has to be finite. If not, the equivalence between investment returns
and returns to the firm breaks down. A related condition that guarantees optimality of the path
satisfying the first-order condition is the transversality condition
lim
t→∞
X
st
P
¡
st
¢
P (s0)
©
A
¡
st
¢
+HI
¡
st
¢
(1− δ)−HK
¡
st
¢ª
Kt
¡
st−1
¢
= 0.
Both conditions are checked in the simulations. I also make sure that gross investment returns
are nonnegative, R ≥ 0. This limited liability requirement is not necessarily needed. On the other
hand, it doesn’t impact any quantitative conclusions.
4.2.3 Models with no technology shocks: Interest rates cannot be constant
I consider here the benchmark environment where the only source of uncertainty that firms face
are stochastic state prices. That is to say, there are no shocks to the production technology. I have
one result: even without technology shocks, investment returns can be optimally state-contingent
as long as interest rates are not constant. In an environment where interest rates are constant
forever, investment returns are constant too. Thus, with constant interest rates it is not possible to
recover the state price process from producers’ first-order conditions. The basic economic idea in
10For the case with unequal probabilities, through a similar argument, the bound equals,
?
1− π
π
?0.5
>
ERM −Rf
std (RM )
,
where π is the probability of the state with the low return realization. Thus, with postively skewed returns the
bound is tighter, with negatively skewed returns it is looser.
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this section is that if a firm is subject to convex capital adjustment costs, it will not find it optimal
to choose a volatile investment plan unless forced by changing prospects in future valuations.
Consider the discrete-time model with no technology shocks. Assuming a general two-state
environment where state prices do not necessarily have a Markov representation. The firm’s
problem is given by
max
{I(st),K(st+1)}
T−1X
t=0
X
st
∙
AKt (st−1)−
½
b
ν
¡
I
¡
st
¢
/Kt
¡
st−1
¢¢ν
+ c
¾
Kt
¡
st−1
¢¸×
⎛
⎝
t−1Y
j=0
P
¡
sj+1|sj
¢⎞⎠
+
X
sT
ΨKT
¡
sT−1
¢⎛⎝T−1Y
j=1
P
¡
sj+1|sj
¢⎞⎠ ,
subject to
0 = (1− δ)Kt
¡
st−1
¢
+ I
¡
st
¢
−Kt+1
¡
st
¢
,
with K (s0) given, P
¡
s0|s0
¢
= 1, and Ψ > 0 a parameter; assuming that st ∈ (s1, s2).
The solution to this problem for T → ∞ is equivalent to the solution of the general version
of the problem with enough regularity so that the firm value is finite. However, it is easy to see
in this model why interest rate volatility is needed. Indeed, from T − 1 to T , without technology
shocks, the return to capital equals the risk free rate. For the second-to-last return-period, that
is, from T − 2 to T − 1, it can be checked that the return is given by
RT−2,T−1
¡
sT−2, sj
¢
=
α
µ
Ψ
RfT−1,T (s
T−2,sj)
¶
α
µ
Ψ
RfT−1,T (s
T−2,s1)
¶
P (s1|sT−2) + α
µ
Ψ
RfT−1,T (s
T−2,s2)
¶
P (s2|sT−2)
, for j = 1, 2.
with α (x) = (A− c)+(1− δ)x+
¡
1− 1ν
¢ ¡
1
b
¢ 1
ν−1 x
ν
ν−1 . Clearly, if the interest rateRfT−1,T
¡
sT−2, sj
¢
is constant, that is if it does not depend on sj , then, RT−2,T−1
¡
sT−2, sj
¢
= RT−2,T−1
¡
sT−2
¢
=
RfT−2,T−1
¡
sT−2
¢
. However, to the extent that one-period interest rates are state-contingent at
T − 1, the return to the firm from T − 2 to T − 1 will be state-contingent, and it will depend on
the technology of the firm, in particular, the parameters of the adjustment cost function. Going
backwards in time, this same argument can be made if all future one-period interest rates are
constant.11 The following proposition summarizes these derivations.
Proposition 1 If one-period interest rates are constant in every period, without technology shocks,
the returns to the firm (and the investment returns) are equal to the one-period interest rate.
A consequence of this result is that, without technology shocks, if investment returns for
one capital stock are state-contingent, then one-period interest rates cannot be constant. The
11As shown in the appendix, the continuous time version of the model admits a more compact proof for this
property.
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importance of this result is that one cannot work with a “nice” benchmark environment with
constant interest rates, in general.12 On the other hand, as shown in the quantitative applications
below, interest rate volatility doesn’t have to be excessively high, even when investment returns
are quite volatile.
5 Calibration
Parameter values are assigned based on 3 types of criteria. First, a set of parameter values are
picked to match direct empirical counterparts. Second, some parameters are chosen to yield the
best implications for key asset pricing moments. Third, some parameters are chosen to make sure
the derived state-prices are admissible. I first present a short summary of the baseline calibration.
The details and the specification with shocks to the investment technology are given thereafter.
5.1 Summary
Table 1 lists the main parameters chosen for the baseline case,
Table 1: Parameter values
ρ = (0.2, 0)
λI (s1) ,λI (s2) = 0.9712, 1.0954
δe, δs = 0.112, 0.031
(Ke/Ze) / (Ks/Zs) = 0.6
νe, νs = 2.5, 5
be, bs, ce, cs so that qZ = 1.5
Ae, As so that R¯ = 1.03
Aj (s1) , Aj (s2) = Aj (1− .236) , Aj (1 + .236)
where ρ stands for the first-order serial correlation of investment growth. A set of parameters is
chosen based on direct empirical counterparts; namely, ρ, (δe, δs), and (Ke/Ze) / (Ks/Zs). The
investment realizations, λI (sj), are chosen to mimic first and second moments of postwar U.S.
investment growth, with the additional restriction that the lowest investment-capital ratio is above
0. In order to replicate steady-state values for qZ, (be, bs) are selected; (ce, cs) are then determined
to generate the lowest possible total cost. For the curvature parameters, it is assumed that νe < νs,
with the exact values picked to maximize the model’s fit. R¯, and thus Ae and As, primarily aﬀect
12Note, setting v = 1 = b, and c = 0 for one of the firms in our analysis would seem to imply constant interest
rates. However, this is not an admissible specification, because the first-order conditions do not describe optimal
firm behavior in general, as this problem is linear.
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the risk free rate. Finally, the volatility of Aj (s) is chosen so that state prices and gross investment
returns are always positive.
5.2 Details of calibration
This section discusses the details of the calibration.
5.2.1 Investment and productivity processes
I consider the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ (BEA) quantity indexes of investment for equipment
& software as well as for structures as the empirical counterparts to investment in units of capital
goods, IZ. Because Z measures the number of capital goods that can be produced from one unit
of the final good, ruling out arbitrage implies that 1/Z is the price of the capital good in terms
of the final good. Equivalently, 1/Z is the replacement cost for capital (not including adjustment
cost), or the bookvalue of capital. For each of the two sectors, Z is computed as the deflator
for nondurable consumption and services divided by the deflator of the sectorial investment good.
Investment expenditure, I, can then be obtained by combining the series for IZ and Z. Based
on annual data covering 1947-2003, the properties of the growth rates of these series are shown in
Table 2.
Table 2: U.S. Investment 1947-2003 (Growth rates)
Mean Standard Deviation 1st Autocorrelation
Investment expenditure IE&S 3.81% 6.98% .08
IS 2.85% 7.94% .27
Investment IZE&S 5.71% 7.81% .13
IZS 2.29% 6.86% .28
Investment technology ZE&S 1.82% 2.56% .66
ZS −.44% 2.35% .31
As is well known, the price of equipment and software has been decreasing over time. The 1.82%
annual increase in Z shows that in Table 2. Table 2 also shows that the volatilities of investment,
and investment expenditure, are very similar across the two sectors.
The calibration of the investment growth process proceeds in two steps. First, the proba-
bility matrix is determined to match the serial correlation and the frequency of low and high
growth states. These two moments do not depend on the shock values themselves but only on the
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probabilities. Specifically, the two diagonal elements of the probability matrix are given as
π11 =
ρ+ fr
1 + fr
; π22 =
1 + fr · ρ
1 + fr
,
where fr is the relative frequency of state 1, the recession state. The numbers of realizations of
investment growth rates above and below the mean are almost the same, thus I set fr = 1. As
shown in Table 2, the first-order serial correlations of the growth rates of investment are 0.13 and
0.28, respectively, and 0.08 and 0.27 for investment expenditure. The common ρ is set at the
average for investment expenditure of 0.2; the case where ρ = 0 is also considered.
For the baseline calibration, I abstract from shocks to the investment technology, Z. Due
to the balanced growth requirement, the growth rates of investment expenditures are equalized
across sectors. The mean of λI − 1 is set at 3.33% per year, which is the average of the historical
investment growth rates across the two sectors. The implied standard deviation is 6.21%. This
is 20% lower than the historic average across the two sectors. With this reduction in volatility,
the investment-capital ratio for structures at the steady state corresponding to the low growth
state is λI (s1) −1 + δs = 0.9712 − 1 + 0.031 = 0.0022. This is suﬃcient to make sure that the
investment-capital ratio is bounded away from zero.13 As explained in the previous section, this
is a way to guarantee positive state prices. Note that the perfect positive sectorial correlation in
the model is not that far from the historical reality. Indeed, the historical sample correlations for
investment across the two sectors are 0.61 and 0.64, for investment and investment expenditure,
respectively.
For the case where the investment specific technology Z is allowed to vary in both sectors, the 6
values for the realized growth rates of investment expenditure (2) and the sector specific investment
technologies (4) are set so as to match as closely as possible the 8 means and standard deviations
of the growth rates of IZE, IZS, ZE&S and ZS. This objective can be achieved quite well.
The standard deviations are again reduced, here by 30%, for the reason explained in the previous
paragraph. The empirical correlations of sectorial investment with its specific technological growth
are 0.43 and −0.32, while the correlations of the technological growth across sectors is 0.3. Clearly,
due the limited degrees of freedom, the two-state process cannot match all these correlations. As
shown below, for most quantities of interest, the Z shocks don’t turn out to matter that much.
5.2.2 Depreciation rates
The depreciation rates for equipment and software as well as for structures, (δe, δs) are based
on time series averages of the depreciation rates reported in the Fixed Assets tables form the
13This is not an issue for equipment & software because the depreciation rate is higher.
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BEA. These are 13.06% and 2.7%, respectively, for the period 1947-2002. Because the BEA’s
depreciation includes physical wear as well as economic obsolescence, the data is adjusted to take
into account that depreciation in the model covers only physical depreciation. To do this the price
increase in the capital good is added, so that
δt =
Dt
Kt
+ (Zt−1/Zt − 1) ,
with Dt depreciation according to the BEA. This adjustment decreases depreciation by 1.82% for
equipment and -0.44% for structures, so that (δe, δs) = (.112, .031).
5.2.3 Relative size of capital stocks
The average ratio of the capital stocks, (Ke,t/Ze,t) / (Ks,t/Zs,t), is needed only for computing
aggregate returns, which, as shown earlier, are value weighted averages of the sectorial returns.
Based on the Current-Cost Net Stocks of Fixed Assets from the BEA, for the period 1947-2002,
the average of (Ke,t/Ze,t) / (Ks,t/Zs,t) is 0.6. Note that given the balanced growth assumptions,
in the model, the ratio of the physical capital stocks Ke,t/Ks,t is trending, while the ratio of the
book values of the capital stocks (Ke,t/Ze,t) / (Ks,t/Zs,t) is stationary.
5.2.4 Adjustment cost and marginal product
The parameters of the adjustment cost functions are set through the following procedure.
1) Select ν 0s to get good results for asset prices under the restriction that νe < νs. Specifically,
the selected values generate roughly the highest equity premium with the lowest reasonable return
volatility, by also guaranteeing positive state prices.
2) Pick b0s so that qZ is consistent with average values reported in the literature.
3) The c0s are then picked to minimize the overall amount of output lost due to adjustment
cost.
In addition to casual empiricism, there is also more direct evidence that suggests that the
adjustment cost curvature is larger for structures than for equipment & software. For example,
as shown in Table 2, the fact that the serial correlation of the growth rates is somewhat higher
for structures than for equipment can be interpreted as an expression of the desire to smooth
investment over time due to the high adjustment cost. As another example, Guiso and Parigi
(1999) examine investment behavior for equipment and structures with Italian data on investment
and sales. Their findings are also consistent with the notion that structures are more costly to
adjust than equipment.
There are many examples of studies that estimate qZ. Lindenberg and Ross (1981) report
averages for two-digit sectors for the period 1960-77 between .85 and 3.08. Lewellen and Badrinath
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(1997) report an average of 1.4 across all sectors for the period 1975-91. Gomes (1999) reports an
average of 1.56. Based on this, I use a steady-state target value for qZ, qZ, of 1.5 for both sectors.
One problem with using empirical studies to infer the required heterogeneity in the sectorial costs
is that most studies consider adjustment costs by sector of activity. For the analysis here, I would
need information about the adjustment costs by type of capital.
One way to gauge whether the adjustment cost parameters are reasonable is to consider the
amount of resources lost due to the adjustment process. For the baseline calibration, the mean
average adjustment cost (obtained in simulations) is 7% and 9% of investment for equipment &
software and structures, respectively. These values depend primarily on the target value for qZ,
which itself does not aﬀect much the model’s asset pricing implications.
The marginal product coeﬃcients Ae and As are set implicitly so as to have the steady-state
return R¯j equalized in the two sectors, to replicate the mean risk free rate, and to make sure
the firm value is finite and the transversality conditions are satisfied. The implied values are
(A1, A2) = (0.1492, 0.0612).
Finally, the variability of the marginal product terms, x in Aj (1± x), is chosen so that for
all paths the implied state-prices are positive, as explained in section 4.2.1, and so that the gross
returns are positive. While these shocks are useful in insuring that the implied state-prices are
admissible, they have only second-order eﬀects on key asset pricing moments. This is because
the marginal product component A represents a small part of the return. The implied correlation
between productivity shocks and investment is positive, which seems reasonable.
6 Quantitative findings
Table 3 presents model implications for the baseline calibration as well as empirical counterparts
for a set of moments. Model results are based on sample moments of very long simulated time
series. For unconditional moments, the key finding is that the model is able to generate an equity
premium of several percentage points with reasonable volatility for the equity return as well as
for the risk free rate. The model’s mean Sharpe ratio is about one third of the one that is implied
by the historic equity premium. Consistent with the analysis in subsection 4.1, given the higher
adjustment cost curvature for structures relative to equipment, structures have a higher return
volatility and a higher risk premium than equipment.
The model is able to generate considerable time-variation in conditional risk premiums. Indeed,
the standard deviation of the one-period ahead conditional equity premium is 5.2%, which is
considerably higher than the standard deviation of the risk free rate at 2.24%. There is a variety
of empirical studies measuring return predictability. For example, Campbell and Cochrane (1999)
22
report R20s of 0.18 and 0.04 for regressions of excess returns on lagged price-dividend ratios at a
one-year horizon for the periods 1947− 95 and 1871− 1993, respectively. Combining the R2 with
the volatility of the excess returns,
√
R2std
¡
R−Rf
¢
provides an estimate of the volatility of the
conditional equity premium. Setting R2 = 0.1 this would be
√
0.1 × 0.17 = 5.27%. Thus, the
model’s value of 5.2% is close.
What is driving expected excess returns? In general, assuming the absence of arbitrage, we
have that
Et
³
Rt+1 −Rft
´
= −σt (mt+1)
Etmt+1
σt (Rt+1) ρt (mt+1, Rt+1) .
Possibly, return volatility σt (Rt+1) can drive risk premiums. However, according to Lettau and
Ludvigson (2004) this is not the case for the U.S. postwar period. They find negative correlations
between conditional means and volatilities. The model here is consistent with this fact. For
the baseline calibration the correlation between conditional means and volatilities is −0.56. This
negative correlation is very robust to parameter changes.
Most standard models cannot replicate this finding of a negative correlation between condi-
tional means and volatilities. With CRRA utility and lognormal consumption, expected returns
are given by
Et
³
Rt+1 −Rft
´
∼= −γ · σt
¡
lnC 0/C
¢ · σt (Rt+1) · ρt (mt+1, Rt+1) .14
In the Mehra-Prescott setup, all terms in the equation are roughly constant, with the correlation,
ρt (mt+1, Rt+1), roughly equal to one. In Campbell and Cochrane’s (1999) model,
σt(mt+1)
Etmt+1
displays
considerable variation. However, as is clear from their Figures 4 and 5, conditional means and
volatilities are positively correlated.
What is driving the negative correlation between the conditional mean and volatility in the
model? It can be shown under fairly general assumptions that this correlation is actually positive
for individual (sectorial) investment returns at steady state levels of investment-capital ratios.
And it is positive for sectorial returns in all simulations. The negative correlation displayed for
the aggregate returns is generated by movements in the sectorial weights. For instance, when
investment capital ratios are low in both sectors, the value of the more volatile sector declines by
relatively more. And, because conditional volatilities of the sectorial returns are relatively stable,
the shift in sectorial weights dominates.
Let us focus now directly on the Sharpe ratio
Et
³
Rt+1 −Rft
´
σt (Rt+1)
= −σt (mt+1)
Etmt+1
ρt (mt+1, Rt+1) . (15)
14The approximation comes from replacing
?
exp [γ2vart (lnC0/C)]− 1 by γ · σt (lnC0/C)
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Given the volatile conditional means and the negative correlation between conditional means
and volatilities, Sharpe ratios are very volatile. According to Lettau and Ludvigson (2004), for
quarterly data, market implied Sharpe ratios have a mean of 0.39 and a standard deviation of
0.448, which implies a coeﬃcient of variation of 0.448/0.39 = 1.15. In the model here, for the
baseline calibration, this ratio equals, 0.26/0.18 = 1.44. That is, considering that the model
generates average Sharpe ratios of roughly 1/3 of the ones implied by the aggregate market, it
nevertheless has the ability to generate considerable volatility in Sharpe ratios
What drives the volatility of the Sharpe ratio? Both parts on the right hand side of equation
(15) contribute. As shown in Table 3, the market price of risk is moving, but its mean and
standard deviation diﬀer from those of the market’s Sharpe ratio. The mean of the market price
of risk is (obviously) larger, while the volatility is lower. Given the two-state setup, the conditional
correlation ρt (mt+1, Rt+1) can only be 1 or -1. Therefore, ρt (mt+1, Rt+1) switches between values
of 1 and -1 as a function of the state of the economy. The case with IID investment growth rates,
presented in Table 4, displays similar properties.
Tables 5 and 6 show results for the calibrations with investment specific technology shocks Z.
In Table 5 the correlation of Z with the same sector’s investment growth equals, 1, in Table 6, it
is -1. While there are some quantitative diﬀerences compared to the baseline case and between
the two cases considered here, none of the main conclusions are aﬀected. Note, for maximum
comparability, I only recalibrated R¯ and x to make sure implied state-prices are admissible.
To further illustrate model properties, I consider the implications from feeding through the
investment realizations for the U.S. for the period 1947-2003. Given that investment growth in the
model has only two values, the fit of the driving process is not perfect. Nevertheless, as shown in
Figure 1, the fit can be very good, with correlations between the model and the data of 0.78 and
0.71 for equipment and structures, respectively. Figure 2 shows that the model’s generated returns
are indeed related to actually realized stock returns, with a correlation of 0.48. Figure 3 shows
conditional moments. The two panels on the left show that conditional volatility is more persistent
than expected returns. The right hand side panel shows the market price of risk and the market’s
Sharpe ratio. Considering the 1990s, through the series of 8 high realizations in investment growth,
expected returns and Sharpe ratios are declining over time. The figure also shows that with a
low investment growth realization, the market’s Sharpe ratio becomes negative, and thus the
conditional correlation ρt (mt+1, Rt+1) becomes positive. It is interesting here to consider again
the calibration with IID investment growth to further highlight the persistent component driving
risk premiums. Figure 3b, presents the realized conditional moments corresponding to the IID
case presented in Table 4. In this case, the relevant state of the economy is summarized by the two
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investment-capital ratios,
¡
Ij
¡
st
¢
/Kj
¡
st−1
¢¢
j=1,2
. The sequence of positive investment growth
realization in the 90s, pushes up these ratios, leading to lower Sharpe ratios. Only three times in
the postwar period does the market’s Sharpe ratio become negative. In the 1990s, it is at the 6th
realization of a high investment rate that the market’s Sharpe ratio becomes negative. The story
told by the model is that throughout the 90’s firms continued to invest heavily, despite declining
expected returns, because investment returns were considered less and less risky.
6.1 Discussion and sensitivity
I provide here some additional information about the factors driving quantitative results.
Let us reconsider equation (10) of the Sharpe ratio at steady state in the continuous-time
model for the baseline parameterization
µj − rf
σj
|ss = ν1 + ν2 − 3
2
σI . (16)
Using the values from the baseline calibration, (ν1, ν2) = (2.5, 5) and σI = 6.21%, the Sharpe ratio
computed from (16) is 0.14. As shown in Table 3 and 4, average Sharpe ratios obtained from the
simulations in the discrete-time model are at 0.18 for the baseline case. Thus, the continuous-time
approximation at steady state gets slightly less than 80% of the simulated average Sharpe ratios.
To get a sense of how much of the diﬀerence is due to the approximation and how much to the
oﬀ steady-state realizations, note that in the baseline model, the Sharpe ratio is at 0.148 at the
steady-state. Thus, the somewhat higher Sharpe ratios reported from the simulations are mainly a
product of the oﬀ steady-state behavior. Of course, the baseline model also is subject to stochastic
marginal products, that is, shocks to A. But not surprisingly, this has only minor eﬀects. Table 7
reports simulation results that further confirm this point. Here the shocks to marginal products
in the equipment sectors are turned oﬀ, while they are maintained for structures so as to assure
that implied state prices are always positive. The main eﬀect of this is to reduce the volatility for
returns on equipment by about 2.5 percentage points. The Sharpe ratio gets to 0.16, compared
to 0.18 in the benchmark case. As suggested by equation (16), turning of the A shocks in the
equipment sector has an eﬀect on the Sharpe ratio primarily because of the asymmetry introduced
across the sectors, rather than because of the volatility in A itself.
7 Conclusions
The paper has examined the implications of producers’ first-order conditions for asset prices in a
model where convex adjustment cost play a major role. One lesson of this analysis is that some
asymmetries across sectors are crucial. One reason for this is that the considered technology does
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not allow a firm to make state-contingent investment decisions for each capital stock individually.
State-contingent investment decisions are possible through the combination of the two stocks. If
both sectorial technologies were identical, optimal decision would generate identical returns, which
would make it impossible to recover the state price process.
The analysis demonstrates the ability of a simple investment cost representation to explain a
number of features of aggregate asset prices. Investment cost curvature and investment volatility
are the main ingredients to explain return volatility and risk premiums.
The quantitative asset pricing implications from a basic representation of the production side
are encouraging. With reasonable assumptions on the quantities, risk premiums and interest rates
come close to explaining observed empirical counterparts. Despite being very stylized, the model
has rich implications for time-varying moments. Specifically, the negative correlation between
means and volatilities is noteworthy.
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Appendix: Continuous-time model
This appendix presents a continuous-time investment model that replicates the setup of the
discrete-time environment. The technology side of the model follows Abel and Eberly (1994) but
without shocks. The main diﬀerence is that here the firm faces changing state prices, while in
their case pricing is risk neutral with constant interest rates. The steps needed to derive the return
equation (8) are also presented.
The capital stock evolves as dKt = (It − δKt) dt, and the investment cost is given by
H (It,Kt) =
½
b
ν
(It/Kt)
ν + c
¾
Kt,
which is homogenous of degree one in I and K. The gross profit is given as
AKt.
Assume that the state-price process is given as
dΛt = −Λtr (xt) dt+ Λtσ (xt) dzt,
where dzt is a one-dimensional Brownian motion, and
dxt = µx(xt)dt+ σx(xt)dzt.
Assume that the functions µx(xt),σx(xt), r (xt) and σ (xt) satisfy the regular conditions such that
there are solutions for the above two SDEs.
The firm maximizes its value
V = max
{It+s}
Et
½Z ∞
0
[AKt+s −H (It+s,K,t+s)]
Λt+s
Λt
ds
¾
.
Given the dynamics of Λt, it is obvious that the firm’s value function V is independent of Λt.
Following from the Markov property of the state variable xt, the firm’s value function would be a
function of (Kt, xt). The HJB equation is
rV = max
{It}
½
[AKt −H (It,Kt)] + (It − δKt)VK + µxVx +
1
2
σ2xVxx + σσxVx
¾
.
The first-order condition is
HI (It,Kt) = VK ≡ qt
That is,
VK = b (It/Kt)
ν−1
It =
µ
VK
b
¶ 1
ν−1
Kt
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Because of constant returns to scale in Kt, following Hayashi, it is easy to see that V (Kt, xt) =
KtVK (xt). Thus, it is clear that optimal investment follows an Ito process, dIt/It = µI (Kt, xt) dt+
σI (Kt, xt) dzt.
Define realized returns to the firm as
AKt −H (It,K,t)
Vt
dt+
dVt
Vt
.
Given Hayashi’s result and the first-order conditions
AKt −H (It,K,t)
Vt
dt+
dVt
Vt
=
AKt −H (It,K,t)
qtKt
dt+
dKt
Kt
+
dqt
qt
.
Using qt = b (It/Kt)
ν−1 and Ito’s lemma, the return equation 8 given in the main text can be
derived.
Proposition 1 in the text shows that for the model without technology shocks, constant interest
rates imply constant investment returns. The continous time model admits a more compact proof
for this property. Indeed, changing to the risk-neutral measure Q, the firm’s problem becomes
V = max
{It+s}
EQt
½Z ∞
0
e−
? t+s
t rudu [AKt+s −H (It+s,K,t+s)] ds
¾
,
with
dxt = (µx(xt) + σ(xt)σx(xt)) dt+ σx(xt)dz
Q
t
and
dKt = (It − δKt) dt.
Written in this form, it is obvious that if the interest rate rt is constant, the firm faces no uncer-
tainty, and thus, it will not introduce any uncertainty into an optimal investment plan.
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Table 3
Asset Pricing Implications: Baseline calibration
 RM                   RM-Rf Rf Market Price of Risk Sharpe Market  RE&S        RE&S-Rf  RS              RS-Rf
Mean 3.59% 1.43% 0.26 0.18 2.14% 5.09%
Std 20.52% 2.24% 0.19 0.26 12.06% 27.23%
Std[E(RM-Rf|t)] 5.20% Corr(E(RM-Rf|t), Std(RM-Rf|t)) -0.56
Std[Std(RM-Rf|t)] 0.51%
Corr( IKZ , E(RM-Rf|t)  ) Corr( IKZ , Rf  ) Corr( IKZ , MPR  )
E&S -0.03 -0.68 -0.58
S -0.34 -0.32 -0.82
Corr( λIZ, RM)
E&S, S 0.98
Real returns 1947-2003 RM                                 RM-Rf Rf Sharpe Market
Mean 8.35% 1.09% 0.49
Std 17.24% 2.07%
( v1=2.5, v2=5 , R=1.03 , x=0.23643 , reduction σ∆I =20% )
Table 4
Asset Pricing Implications: IID case; (no serial correlation)
 RM                   RM-Rf Rf Market Price of Risk Sharpe Market  RE&S          RE&S-Rf  RS                 RS-Rf
Mean 3.52% 1.43% 0.20 0.18 2.13% 4.94%
Std 20.75% 1.91% 0.13 0.15 12.21% 27.09%
Std[E(RM-Rf|t)] 3.04% Corr(E(RM-Rf|t), Std(RM-Rf|t)) -0.95
Std[Std(RM-Rf|t)] 0.45%
Corr( IKZ , E(RM-Rf|t)  ) Corr( IKZ , Rf  ) Corr( IKZ , MPR  )
E&S -0.62 -0.70 -0.54
S -0.89 -0.35 -0.78
Corr( λIZ, RM)
E&S, S 0.99
Real returns 1947-2003 RM                                 RM-Rf Rf Sharpe Market
Mean 8.35% 1.09% 0.49
Std 17.24% 2.07%
( v1=2.5, v2=5 , R=1.03 , x=0.23643 , reduction σ∆I =20% )
Table 5
Asset Pricing Implications: with shocks to investment technology, positive correlation λ I and λZ  
 RM                   RM-Rf Rf Market Price of Risk Sharpe Market  RE&S          RE&S-Rf  RS                 RS-Rf
Mean 2.84% 2.01% 0.29 0.17 1.73% 4.04%
Std 17.14% 2.95% 0.20 0.30 10.53% 22.59%
Std[E(RM-Rf|t)] 5.01% Corr(E(RM-Rf|t), Std(RM-Rf|t)) -0.70
Std[Std(RM-Rf|t)] 0.29%
Corr( IKZ , E(RM-Rf|t)  ) Corr( IKZ , Rf  ) Corr( IKZ , MPR  )
E&S 0.11 -0.74 0.14
S -0.33 -0.29 -0.16
Corr( λIZ, RM)
E&S, S 0.98
Real returns 1947-2003 RM                                 RM-Rf Rf Sharpe
Mean 8.35% 1.09% 0.49
Std 17.24% 2.07%
( v1=2.5, v2=5 , R=1.033 , x=0.28245 , reduction σ∆I =30% )
Table 6
Asset Pricing Implications: with shocks to investment technology, negative correlation λI and λZ  
 RM                   RM-Rf Rf Market Price of Risk Sharpe Market  RE&S          RE&S-Rf  RS                 RS-Rf
Mean 4.13% 1.19% 0.30 0.20 2.77% 5.49%
Std 20.97% 3.17% 0.21 0.30 14.06% 26.45%
Std[E(RM-Rf|t)] 6.07% Corr(E(RM-Rf|t), Std(RM-Rf|t)) -0.66
Std[Std(RM-Rf|t)] 0.29%
Corr( IKZ , E(RM-Rf|t)  ) Corr( IKZ , Rf  ) Corr( IKZ , MPR  )
E&S 0.11 -0.57 0.15
S -0.32 -0.08 -0.16
Corr( λIZ, RM)
E&S, S 0.98
Real returns 1947-2003 RM                                 RM-Rf Rf Sharpe
Mean 8.35% 1.09% 0.49
Std 17.24% 2.07%
( v1=2.5, v2=5 , R=1.033 , x=.30846 , reduction σ∆I =30% )
Table 7
Asset Pricing Implications: Baseline calibration; No A shocks in sector 1 (Equipment)
 RM                   RM-Rf Rf Market Price of Risk Sharpe Market  RE&S        RE&S-Rf  RS              RS-Rf
Mean 2.89% 2.19% 0.24 0.16 1.45% 4.35%
Std 19.47% 2.39% 0.17 0.25 9.69% 27.24%
Std[E(RM-Rf|t)] 4.65% Corr(E(RM-Rf|t), Std(RM-Rf|t)) -0.33
Std[Std(RM-Rf|t)] 1.01%
Corr( IKZ , E(RM-Rf|t)  ) Corr( IKZ , Rf  ) Corr( IKZ , MPR  )
E&S 0.06 -0.87 -0.58
S -0.25 -0.60 -0.83
Corr( λIZ, RM)
E&S, S 0.98
Real returns 1947-2003 RM                                 RM-Rf Rf Sharpe Market
Mean 8.35% 1.09% 0.49
Std 17.24% 2.07%
( v1=2.5, v2=5 , R=1.03 , x=0.23643 , reduction σ∆I =20% )
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